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PREFACE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This document reports activities and results of Task 3.1 of the Intelligent Energy Europe 
supported project RES4Less. This work is the initial analyses and survey of barriers for 
implementing cooperation mechanisms in the EU countries. This work builds on earlier 
Intelligent Energy Europe projects and is the result of literature surveys and discussions in the 
project group. Furthermore, fruitful inputs have been obtained in the stakeholder workshops 
carried out within the RES4Less project. Additionally, the topic has been presented and 
debated at two international conferences.  
 
The preliminary results were also shared and enriched by comments from other members of 
the RES4Less Team during internal meetings of the project.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The RES Directive 2009/28/EC set legally binding targets for EU Member States on energy 
consumption from renewable sources – the 2020 RES targets. A part of this can be achieved 
through the use of cooperation mechanisms: statistical transfer, joint project and joint support 
scheme. The intention of the cooperation mechanisms is to provide the flexibility needed to 
achieve Europe’s renewable energy targets in a more cost-efficient way. In Task 3 of the 
RES4Less project we analyse the barriers for two of the cooperation mechanisms: joint 
project and joint support schemes. This report is the outcome of the work in task 3.1 with the 
purpose of analysing the barriers for cooperation mechanisms and the critical success factors 
that ensure the removal of the most important barriers. The general barriers identified and 
covered in this report will be used as input for further analysis in the specific case studies in 
Task 3.3 to 3.5 of this work package.  
 
Cooperation mechanisms have the potential to reduce the compliance costs of reaching the 
2020 RES targets for EU member states.  The initiation of cooperation mechanisms is 
dependent on addressing a range of barriers. This report examines the barriers associated with 
different structures, power markets, regulation and policies in member states.  Critical barriers 
for the implementation of cooperation are identified and the possible link with the core 
compensation issue is discussed.  
 
The precondition for establishing cooperation is that the participating countries all need to 
have a net benefit from cooperation. This will in most cases require that a compensation 
scheme/RES price can be designed to reduce the barriers.  
The first category of barriers identified here is within the direct support for renewables and 
covers both the type of support, the objective of support scheme as well as the level of 
support/financing. The objective for support can be such domestic priorities as 
development/protection of infant industries, employment, and diversification of energy 
sources or reduction of negative externalities such as emissions/pollution. One of the 
important examples is connected to the existence of a high level of technology-specific 
support for industrial development reasons that would be abolished if engaging in full joint 
support schemes with one common support level.  
Power market differences are the source of other important barriers, as widespread 
cooperation would imply that power market price levels and composition are affected. Such 
effects would benefit some and draw on others. For example existing power generators in a 
host country would suffer from expanding considerably generation capacity with low 
marginal cost technologies. On the other hand consumers in the host country would benefit 
through reduced power prices.  
Institutional barriers, especially regarding the entities regulating investment in renewables, 
network infrastructure and financing principles for renewable can also be substantial.  
 
Within our analysis, barriers are characterized in two dimensions, namely their importance 
and the difficulty to overcome (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Categorisation of barriers 
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Support schemes and power prices are among the most important barriers. Of these the 
support scheme barriers seem the easiest to overcome. For more concrete conclusions on how 
to overcome the barriers the constellations of specific countries, technologies and type of 
cooperation have to be addressed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The RES Directive 2009/28/EC (European Commission 2009) sets legally binding targets for EU 
Member States on energy consumption from renewable sources – the 2020 RES targets. A part of 
this can be achieved through the use of cooperation mechanisms: statistical transfer, joint project 
and joint support schemes. The intention of cooperation mechanisms is to assure the flexibility 
needed to achieve Europe’s renewable energy targets in the most cost-efficient way.  
 
Cooperation mechanisms do have potential benefits, but there are a number of barriers for their 
successful implementation. This report reviews and categorises the barriers and illustrates which 
barriers have to be addressed specifically for all types of cooperation mechanisms. The report will 
draw on literature studies, especially the previous projects in IEE dealing with cooperation 
mechanisms and RES support and system integration issues. 
 
The EU 2020 member state (MS) targets for renewable energy are based on the national shares in 
2005. The required total addition of renewable energy for the EU has been distributed among the 
member states taking very few parameters into account (Klessmann et al 2010). One parameter 
considered is the income level, thereby putting a slightly higher burden on wealthier countries. 
However, the differences in costs of implementing renewable investments for member states has 
not been directly included in setting the targets, so there is no consideration for cost efficient 
implementation. Therefore potential benefits through reduced compliance costs for countries exist 
if they can implement their targets jointly. These benefits can be realised by using cooperation 
mechanisms. Current EU legislation has opened for using joint support schemes, joint projects 
and statistical transfers as support for promoting renewable energy to meet the 2020 targets, but 
the details for these mechanisms have not been laid out.  
 
The least complicated mechanism is statistical transfer, an ex-post transfer of virtual RES 
certificates that can be used for target compliance. This mechanism depends directly on 
governmental involvement and can also be associated with the other mechanisms at the final stage 
of transferring the achieved RES certificates from one country to another. It does not by itself 
induce additional RES development since no prior agreements assure the sale of the credits and 
therefore it has limited use as promoting a more efficient distribution of RES development. Due to 
the incentive structure behind this mechanism, it is expected that only very limited ‘statistical 
transfer’-volumes will be available to MS for complying with their target in 2020 (Klessman et al 
2010). The reason being that, if this mechanism should be used as strategic instrument rather than 
as an ad-hoc means of ‘filling the gaps’, MS would have to guarantee the delivery of RES 
certificates under a statistical transfer several years prior to 2020, so that the receiving MS can 
avoid the development of own RES production. However, many MS, especially those using Feed-
in tariffs or other non quantity-driven support systems, will not be able to guarantee delivery long 
before 2020, as they will be uncertain in regards to their own target compliance. Therefore sharing 
of compliance risk would be a critical issue in agreements on statistical transfers ex ante.  
 
The mechanism of joint projects gives those MS that lack sufficient low-cost RES potential (user 
country) the possibility to develop projects in another MS (host country). In this case the user 
country would support investors in undertaking the project or investors are supported jointly by 
the two countries and then the total costs are balanced via a compensation scheme. MS can either 
cooperate on a project-to-project basis or agree on a special support framework for a number of 
projects. These special support frameworks can be defined for a certain technology or a certain 
area, and can be implemented in parallel to existing national support schemes. In the medium to 
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long term, the cooperation on special support frameworks might lead to a further expansion of the 
cooperation itself (i.e. through standardisation), and therewith lead to the development of joint 
support schemes.  
 
The mechanism of joint support schemes is a broad cooperation of MS on a national level and 
may pave the path towards harmonisation in the long run. In this case the MS agree on a common 
support scheme. The introduction of a common support scheme gives the greatest potential to 
efficiently utilise RES potential in the involved MS, as the establishment of equal incentives will 
ensure the development of RES at the most beneficial sites in the cooperation area. A less 
ambitious option is that the MS partially coordinate their national support schemes, such that the 
common support scheme only applies to specific technologies, or to specific areas. These 
possibilities will be dealt with in more detail in Task 3.2 of the RES4Less project, but the barriers 
are treated in this report. 
 
In Table 1 the main characteristics of the three cooperation mechanisms are summarized.  
 
Table 1 Cooperation mechanisms and their main characteristics 
Statistical Transfer Joint Project Joint support scheme 
Ex-post transfer of virtual 
RES certificates 
Gives MS that lack 
sufficient low-cost RES 
potential the possibility to 
develop projects in another 
MS 
Broad cooperation of MS 
on a national level 
Does not induce additional 
RES development 
MS can either cooperate 
on a project-to-project 
basis or agree on a special 
support framework for a 
number of projects 
MS agree on a common 
support scheme – fully 
(cover all technologies and 
areas) or partially (only 
covers specific 
technologies, or to specific 
areas) 
 Support frameworks can be 
defined for a certain 
technology or a certain 
area 
Gives the greatest potential 
to efficiently utilise RES 
potential in the involved MS
 
 
The cooperation mechanisms actually implemented might be somewhere in between, as they may 
contain elements from both types. If, e.g., two countries agree on a common tender for an offshore 
wind farm supported by a price premium are we then dealing with a joint support scheme or a 
joint project? The fact that it is a limited project – the offshore wind farm – makes it a joint 
project, whereas the support scheme – the price premium – makes it a joint support scheme.  
 
In Task 3 of the RES4Less project we analyse the barriers for two of the cooperation mechanisms: 
joint projects and joint support schemes. We do not address the Statistical Transfers since the 
barriers and the complexities related statistical transfers initially in the project definition were 
assumed to be very limited. Furthermore, transfers do not provide more efficient RES 
development but only exploit ex post surpluses. This report is the outcome of the work in Task 3.1 
with the purpose of analysing the barriers for cooperation mechanisms and critical success factors 
that ensures the removal the most important barriers. We consider barriers existing due to 
differences in types of support schemes and level of support, as well as barriers associated with 
differences in power market regulation and power prices. Furthermore, we consider the barriers 
arising due to the costs and benefits connected to cooperation. 
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One general barrier for implementing RES jointly among member states is related to grid 
connection and transmission capacity. These issues are beyond the scope of this report and will be 
discussed in work package 4.  
  
 
D3.1 Barriers and critical success factors 4 
2 BARRIERS 
The purpose of cooperation mechanisms is to achieve the EU 2020 RES target in a more efficient 
way, compared to the individual country solution. However, cooperation between countries does 
not seem to come along automatically, due to the presence of several barriers.  
 
The overall precondition for the countries to engage in cooperation is that member states will only 
agree on a cooperation mechanism if they all benefit from it. This means that the overall benefits 
from cooperation for all MS have to exceed the overall costs from cooperation. Therefore, in 
general, main barrier is the challenge relating to identifying, quantifying as well as establishing 
how to allocate the costs and benefits such that all countries eventually benefit from cooperation. 
This issue is addressed in Section 2.5. Other issues may result in barriers:  
 Different political agendas such as supporting certain industries or the assumption that 
development of renewable energy will provide positive welfare effects such as increased 
employment and technological development. These issues are discussed in section 2.1.  
 Increased share of renewable energy has different effects on the energy system. As 
renewable energy is assumed to be connected to lower marginal production costs the areas with 
increased share of renewable energy will experience a decrease in the electricity price. This 
benefits the consumers but has consequences for the energy system that have to be taken into 
account. These issues are addressed in the Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
 Differences in legislation and political acceptance (Section 2.4). 
 The exact consequences for the MS in case they do not reach their target have not been 
specified, the alternative costs of not achieving the target are unknown, decreasing the overall 
motivation to engage in cooperation (Section 2.4). 
 Post-2020 targets have not been set, there is high uncertainty on the actual long-term value 
of renewable energy. This indeed increases the difficulties in allocating costs and benefits related 
to the development of renewable energy and constitutes a serious barrier. This problem is 
discussed in Section 2.6. 
 
2.1 Different RES support systems  
Historically EU countries have applied several different support schemes aiming at several 
different technologies (Hass et al 2011). Feed-in tariffs seemed to be the most popular support 
scheme from the very beginning but also tax incentives as well as tendering played a role. Later 
quotas and tradable green certificates increased in popularity in the MS (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Overview of support schemes applied in some EU countries 
Member 
state 
Wind onshore  Wind offshore Hydro  
(mainly small 
scale)  
Geothermal  Solar PV  Biomass, 
Biogas and 
Waste, others  
Austria Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff  
Belgium  TGC  TGC  TGC   TGC  TGC  
Czech Rep.  Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium 
 Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in-
premium 
 Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-
premium  
Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium 
Estonia Feed-in tariff 
Direct support 
Feed-in tariff 
Direct support 
Feed-in tariff 
Direct support 
  Feed-in tariff 
Direct support 
Finland Investment 
subsidies 
Electricity tax 
Investment 
subsidies 
Electricity tax 
Investment 
subsidies 
Electricity tax 
Investment 
subsidies 
Investment 
subsidies 
Investment 
subsidies 
Electricity tax 
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returns returns returns returns 
Denmark  Feed-in-premium  Feed-in tariff  
Tendering 
  Tax 
exemptions 
Feed-in-premium 
France  Feed-in tariff  
Call for tenders  
 Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff 
Call for 
tenders  
Feed-in tariff  
Call for tenders 
(biomass)  
Germany  Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff  
Great Britain  TGC  TGC  TGC   TGC TGC  
Greece Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff 
Ireland Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff 
Italy  Feed-in tariff  
TGC  
  Feed-in tariff 
TGC 
Feed-in tariff  
TGC 
Feed-in 
premium  
TGC  
Feed-in tariff  
TGC  
Hungary  Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff    Feed-in tariff  
Lithuania  Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff  
Luxembourg  Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in-premium 
 Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in-
premium 
 Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in-
premium  
Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium 
Poland TGC TGC TGC TGC TGC TGC 
Portugal  Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff  
Romania Exempt from 
excise payment 
TGC 
Exempt from 
excise 
payment 
TGC 
Exempt from 
excise 
payment 
TGC 
Exempt from 
excise payment 
TGC 
Exempt from 
excise 
payment 
TGC 
Exempt from 
excise payment 
TGC 
Slovenia Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in premium 
Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in 
premium 
Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in 
premium 
Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in premium 
Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in 
premium 
Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in premium 
Spain Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium  
Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-
premium  
Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-
premium  
Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium  
Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium 
Sweden  TGC  TGC  TGC  TGC  TGC  TGC  
The 
Netherlands  
Feed-in tariff  
Feed-in-premium  
Feed-in tariff  Feed-in tariff   Feed-in tariff 
Feed-in-
premium  
Feed-in tariff  
Source: CEER 2008, CEER 2011 
 
The fact that the different MS historically have applied different support schemes aiming at 
different technologies may constitute a barrier. In the following we address the issues regarding 
differences in RES support schemes.  
2.1.1 Different support schemes 
Different support schemes are normally applied dependent on the development of the technology 
in question. The support mechanism providing the most security for the investors is investment 
support. In this case the investor is granted an up-front support covering parts of or the entire 
investment costs removing the technological risk. Next in line to provide the security for the 
investors is a fixed feed-in tariff replacing the power market price. In this case the investor is 
guaranteed a fixed price for the electricity sold and is therefore not exposed to market risk at all. 
The feed-in tariff is followed by the fixed price premium on top of the power market price where 
the investor to a larger extent is exposed to the market risk as the revenue is dependent on the 
market price as well. Tradable green certificates expose the technology to a higher level of 
competition as the support is entirely determined on a market for certificates. Finally, the 
technology is sufficiently mature to compete on the market and receives no support.  
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Figure 2 Technological development and support schemes 
Technological risk Regulatory risk Market risk
Investment support
Feed-in tariff
Premium
Green certificates
Competitiveness
Technology 
deployment
Maturity of technology, 
Time
 
 
The diversification of support schemes in European MS can be explained by the different 
perception of the technological maturity in different countries, as well as the perception of how 
necessary support is in order to assure the targeted RES. The size of the market can also affect the 
support scheme chosen: for example it makes less sense to implement a tradable green certificate 
scheme in a small market compared to a larger market.  
 
In the case that two countries decide to cooperate via a joint support scheme, and the two 
countries as a point of departure do not have the same support scheme, a number of barriers arise. 
First of all there are a number of administrative barriers: As the existing capacity is supported 
from one kind of support scheme while the capacity installed under the cooperation between 
countries will be supported from another kind of support scheme, the regulator will have to 
administer two support schemes. Further, as the new type of support scheme will be set in place 
the legislation also has to be regulated imposing further costs on the system. The extra 
management increases the administration costs related to RES development under cooperation 
and decreases the motivation for cooperation. 
 
Furthermore, firms investing in renewable technologies will perceive the introduction of new 
support schemes as an increased uncertainty. They face new risks and new cash flows they have 
to take into account. This leads to more transaction costs and decreases the amount of 
investments.  
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2.1.2 Combinations of support systems 
In this section we discuss the different combinations of support schemes and the implications for 
cooperation. Further, we briefly assess the extent to which the combinations are a barrier to 
cooperation or works well together.  
 
Feed-in tariff and tradable green certificate support schemes 
The two support schemes offer different properties with regard to the volumes realized and the 
support costs. Feed-in does not control the volume and could generate both excess and deficit 
results relative to 2020 RES targets. Tradable green certificate (TGC) schemes require a broader 
range of conditions fulfilled to work well, of which the liquidity and transparency of the market is 
most difficult to satisfy. Feed-in offers less risk in the support revenue to investors whereas TGC 
only does so if there is a commitment to increase the renewable obligations along the way. 
Smaller investors would normally favour the feed-in to the certificate scheme if the intended level 
of support is in the same range. 
 
Combing the two is possible with feed-in for some technologies and a common certificate system 
for other technologies. The main barrier is that the feed-in easily offers technology specific 
support level and the certificates would work best with competition between technologies and 
hence there is a contradiction between the two support systems.  
 
Feed-in tariff and tendering schemes 
Feed-in schemes work well with both smaller and larger projects, but are inflexible in providing 
the market incentive to increase or cut back on RES deployment speed. Tendering works well 
with larger projects that require interaction with government/TSO, planning of infrastructure and 
localization of investment etc. Feed-in and tendering are often combined with a fixed support at 
the time of settling with the tender winners. New tenders are associated with a different level of 
feed-in tariff. The actual expansion of renewables can thus be controlled contrary to the case 
where feed-in alone is used.  
 
The combination works in particular in cases where the tenders are for high cost surplus RES 
options, and can be used for cooperation and RES certificate exchange.  
 
Feed-in tariff and feed-in premium 
Feed-in tariff and feed-in premium are often used technology specific aiming at technologies at 
different technological stage of development. Feed-in premiums are used for technologies that are 
mature, are very flexible operationally or have already high penetration rates in the power system. 
A feed-in premium provides the incentive for the producer to respond to the market price and thus 
stabilises the electricity market in contrast to the feed-in tariff, giving the producer the incentive to 
produce at any given moment. 
 
Combining the two support schemes for different technologies or different areas is no problem. 
However, the technologies supported by a feed-in tariff may attract more investors due to the 
higher level of security and therefore implementing one common support system may have 
impacts on power markets both through operation and deployment of the given technology.  
 
Tradable green certificates and tendering 
TGC is often used when competition between technologies is a target whereas tendering is applied 
for larger projects implemented without interfering with the remaining part of RES support. The 
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two support schemes thus have opposite points of departure, and combining the two would reduce 
the effectiveness of the TGC scheme. 
 
Tradable green certificates and feed-in premium 
The application of TGC has competition among technologies in mind whereas a feed-in premium 
can be technology specific as well as general. The TGC has its advantage in meeting a specific 
RES quantity target if designed with sufficiently high non-compliance targets, whereas the 
premium has the advantage in providing a known level of support cost per unit RES deployed. 
Depending on the use of feed-in premium there may or may not be a contradiction between the 
two support schemes. If the feed-in premium is general it may provide a similar support to RES 
investors as a TCG scheme and there will not necessarily be a barrier between countries using the 
two support schemes. If the feed-in premium on the other hand is technology specific, the main 
barrier is that there is a contradiction between the two support systems in terms of deploying the 
cheapest RES options or supporting all technologies. 
 
Tendering and feed-in premium 
Tendering works well with larger projects whereas feed-in premium works well with both smaller 
and larger projects. They can be both technology specific as well as general. Combining the two 
schemes works in particular in cases where the tenders are for high cost surplus RES options, and 
can be used for cooperation and RES certificate exchange. 
 
In Table 3 the main issues related to combining different support schemes are summarized.  
 
Table 3 Combination of support schemes in host and user country   
 Feed-in tariffs TGC Tendering  Feed-in premium 
Feed-in tariffs - Different levels of 
support 
- Different targeted 
technologies 
- Different support 
period and uncertainty 
- Feed-in is 
technology-specific, 
TGC works best with 
competition and no 
technology 
differentiation 
- Different support 
level  
- The two schemes 
are often used in 
combination for larger 
projects, where the 
needed feed-in tariff 
is the outcome of the 
tender 
- Different support 
levels 
- Different 
targeted 
technologies 
- Different 
technological 
stage 
TGC  - Different price levels, 
i.e. support levels 
- TGC may be general 
or only covering some 
technologies 
- Tendering is 
technology-specific, 
TGC works best with 
competition 
- Tendering is used 
for large project, TGC 
is general 
 
- Feed-in premium 
may or may not 
be technology 
specific, TGC 
enhance 
competition 
between 
technologies 
 
Tendering   
 
- Tendering used in 
two countries do not 
necessarily differ. 
Procedures, support 
rules, network 
connection etc are 
defined specifically 
for each tender. The 
tender outcome will 
not depend on 
whether the tender is 
called in more than 
one country. 
- Feed-in premium 
could be general 
as well as 
technology 
specific, tender is 
mostly technology 
specific  
- The two 
schemes could 
easily be used in 
combination for 
larger projects, 
where the needed 
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feed-in premium is 
the outcome of 
the tender 
Feed-in premium    - Different levels 
of support 
- Different 
targeted 
technologies 
 
In WP2 of the RES4Less project (Dalla Longa et al 2011) the pure technology costs were 
addressed. If we assign value to RES targets and the secondary objectives of technology 
development, industrial development, employment and diversified power technologies the cost 
curves should be evaluated against these benefits. That will be the justifying argument for the 
difference in support that some support schemes target. The support schemes with general non-
technology specific support (broad TGC schemes, common FIT or common premium) correspond 
more directly to the cost curves produced in WP2.  
 
2.1.3 Technology-specific support versus general support 
In this section we describe how the differences in support schemes are motivated by differences in 
the objectives of the support schemes. We specifically address the issue of technology-specific 
versus general support.  
 
A support system can have a number of different objectives. These determine whether 
technology-specific or general support should be adopted: 
 competition between RES technologies and cost efficiency  general  
 developing infant domestic industries  technology-specific  
 developing immature technologies  technology-specific 
 secure diversified power technologies  technology specific 
 
In the following we discuss the identified objectives and related barriers: 
 
 If the objective of a support scheme is to develop infant domestic industries, the support 
scheme will most likely be technology-specific. In that case it might in fact support an objective 
of giving immature technologies more support than more mature technologies if the industry in 
question is related to immature technologies. On the other hand if the infant domestic industry 
targeted by the support is related to a more mature renewable technology the support scheme does 
not support such objective. A support scheme aiming at supporting infant domestic industries will 
not necessarily assure diversified deployment of RES technologies as more mature technologies 
might loose their competitiveness if more immature technologies are targeted by the industry 
specific support. Finally, a support scheme aiming at supporting infant domestic industries will 
most likely not assure competition between technologies as specific technologies are promoted 
leaving other technologies behind. Depending on the objective of the regulator and the support 
schemes traditionally used in the participating countries a barrier to cooperation may arise.  
 
 If a support scheme is designed to promote competition between renewable technologies it 
is quite difficult to combine it with a scheme that has the objective of securing a diversified 
deployment of RES technologies. In the first case the most mature and therefore most competitive 
technologies will presumably become the most widespread. In the latter case, where the objective 
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is to secure diversified deployment of technologies, higher support should be given to less mature 
technologies as they are less competitive, and therefore actually support the objective of 
promoting immature technologies.  
 
 Finally, a scheme with the objective to secure diversified power technologies will only 
contradict with an objective of competition between technologies. Such a scheme probably will 
support both infant domestic industries as well as provide higher support for immature 
technologies. This, in general, contradicts the idea of competition between technologies as the 
technology specific support schemes and support levels will not assure that the cheapest 
technologies possible will be the ones applied. 
2.1.4 Different support levels  
Difference in support levels creates barriers as the support levels express the willingness of the 
population/government to pay for renewable expansion. Barriers might arise due to a different 
level of RES support in cooperating countries as at least one of the countries will have to adjust 
their support level. If a country has a certain support level being sufficient to achieve its own RES 
targets, but having excess capacity/potentials, the country is a potential host country. A user 
country – with a higher support level and lower capacity/potentials – would then like to cooperate 
with the host country in order to achieve its RES targets at lower costs. Assuming that the two 
countries agreed on introducing a joint support scheme for just one or all the renewable 
technologies the effects on the two countries are as follows:  
 
 The support level in host country would inevitably rise as the needed amount of installed 
renewable capacity would increase leading to a larger share of the more expensive technologies. 
In this case the host country (with the low support) would have important opposition against the 
increase in support cost for their RES development especially if the burden is directly on the 
consumers and industry. On the contrary the producers of renewable energy would gain from the 
cooperation.  
 
 The user country will gain as the total costs of compliance would decrease. However, the 
producers of renewable energy in the user country would lose as the support level of the user 
country will decrease compared to a situation where the user country should reach its RES targets 
within its own boarders. Renewable industry, green development supporters and renewable 
investors would all oppose to the reduction of support levels even though it is the benefit of the 
cooperation that support can be reduced because cheaper options can be exploited. 
 
For example, Germany and Spain could decide to cooperate on a joint support scheme for new 
photovoltaic (PV) installations. The two support schemes are currently rather similar, featuring a 
differentiated feed-in tariff. However, Spain recently introduced a capacity cap, limiting the 
support of new PV installations, because they feared a too high increase of their overall RES 
support cost. At the same time, there is a significant build-out of PV in Germany to a much higher 
RES support cost. Assuming a joint support system, where Germany and Spain would have one 
common market for PV at an adequate common support level, the build-out of PV would move 
from Germany to Spain (due to the much better solar radiation levels). The overall support cost 
would be reduced by the difference of the required support cost in Germany to the required 
support cost in Spain. Germany and Spain would then share the RES certificates and the support 
cost. However, finding the right cost allocation would be a difficult negotiation. Germany would 
have a significant reduction in support cost (per generated unit of renewable energy), but would 
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also lose local benefits. Spain would need to be compensated for bearing all physical and market 
integration issues, but would have all local benefits including the innovation and industry benefits, 
which currently seems to be a significant factor in Germany’s PV support considerations.  
 
For this example the critical success factors are that Germany and Spain should be able to agree 
on a compensation scheme that would take the following into account:  
 The gains for Germany with respect to decreased support level  
 The costs for Spain with respect to the market integration 
 The indirect benefits for Spain given by innovation, industry benefits and job creation 
 
2.1.5 Concluding remarks 
As seen the EU countries apply a wide variety of support schemes targeting different technologies 
(Table 2). For most of the support schemes there is as such no problem in combining the use of 
the different support schemes. However, the purpose of TGC, i.e. competition between 
technologies, contradicts the use of the tendering and to a certain extent feed-in tariffs as well as 
feed-in premiums, which often target a specific technology with a pre-determined support level. 
Therefore the largest challenge seems to agree on which support scheme to apply and how to 
coordinate with the support schemes already in place.  
 
2.2 Power markets 
Power markets differ even though they are in many cases coupled and therefore prices to some 
extent are correlated. Differences in market concentration and technology composition constitute 
potential barriers. The mix of technologies in power generation can be more or less flexible to 
adjust to short term changes in renewable generation. It can be an important barrier for increasing 
the renewable capacity in a country if existing inflexible generation capacity has to be combined 
with new fluctuating renewables, e.g. combining nuclear power with large amounts of wind 
energy, as the system may not be tuned to handle this. Increasing the flexibility of the system may 
impose additional costs on the electricity producers and hence the consumers.  
 
Power market price level and volatility differ from country to country and this creates additional 
barriers. Price levels in some countries will not be affected very much from increasing or 
decreasing the renewable expansion. However countries where renewable expansion potentials 
are abundant and cheap could experience considerable changes in power prices in case of 
expansion of the renewable energy shares. The market price an consequently the investment 
incentives are affected.  
 
2.2.1 Market price 
Higher shares of renewable energy in the energy system lead to deterioration in profitability of 
existing conventional and renewable capacity. Supporting such a development will be opposed by 
producers whereas consumers will support such a strategy. Barriers may arise for example to 
compensate losses on the firms/producers’ side with gains in terms of lower prices on the 
consumers’ side. However, the level compensation is not necessarily easy to establish and more 
importantly such compensation is also controversial and therefore not very easy to carry out.  
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2.2.2 Investment incentives 
As higher shares of low marginal costs RES in the energy system is assumed to lead to lower 
short term electricity prices the country facing reduced prices will probably have to provide 
alternative ways to secure the incentives for future investment in conventional capacity. 
Additionally, the option of securing the connection to other markets with higher market prices 
could reduce the effect of capacity on the market price and thus the effect on the investment 
incentives.   
 
2.2.3 Generation mix 
Generation mix might be quite substantially influenced by intensively exploiting one cheap 
renewable resource. First of all the expansion of the technology itself will affect the generation 
mix. Secondly, the general power price, which is assumed to be reduced for low marginal costs 
RES as referred above, makes the least efficient base load plants less profitable or even loss 
making resulting in permanent shut downs of these plants. The generation mix will consequently 
become less diversified and the sector becomes more vulnerable to changes in the prices of few or 
just one fuel, such as natural gas. This will eventually affect the sector in a direction that it 
provides less security of supply for power. 
2.3 Network regulation 
Network regulation varies a great deal between member states from rate of return to incentive 
based price and revenue caps. The details in incentive regulation include numerous differences 
and the enforcement of regulation is not always effective. Network regulation has impacts on the 
incentives for networks to facilitate efficient connection of new technologies and network 
reinforcement (Ropenus et al, 2011).  
 
If national regulation allows networks to include reinforcement investments caused by renewable 
generation in their capital base and thereby revenue cap, then this cost will be borne by the 
network customers. As special treatment of projects stemming from cooperation mechanisms in 
regulation is not practical, nor desirable, the host country might require the user country to 
compensate also this cost in case of cooperation. However, the transfer to network customers 
seems very difficult to realise.  
 
2.4 Institutional barriers 
In this section we address a list of issues gathered under the headline institutional barriers. They 
are barriers related to legislation, institutional design as well as political acceptance. Institutional 
barriers especially regarding the entities regulating investment in renewables, network 
infrastructure and financing principles for renewable can also be substantial. Even strategic 
consideration for domestic business and generator interests among national regulatory authorities 
can form a barrier even though this objective is not openly pursued.  
2.4.1 Legislation 
Different issues regarding legislation may constitute barriers for cooperation. First of all there is 
the question of how to structure the agreements legally, the resources used on lawyers, and how 
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legal agreements are traditionally designed in the one country compared to the other country. 
These costs reduce the incentives to engage in cooperation with other countries. 
 
Furthermore, there are differences among countries regarding how the costs of support are 
allocated: is it public service obligations for the electricity consumers or is it the government 
providing the support? Depending on the model used in the two countries prior to cooperation the 
countries may have to agree on a type of cost allocation constituting a potential barrier.  
2.4.2 Political acceptance 
Political acceptance is closely related to acceptance of the population, which again is linked to a 
sense of fairness. In respect hereto the issue of “not in my backyard” – relating to the regular 
assumption that renewable energy production is generally attractive as long as the visual and other 
side effects do not affect “me” – is turned up side down in the sense that social acceptance is 
harder to achieve for projects taking place abroad: In case the support and development of specific 
RES technologies and industries are in focus, the population’s acceptance of being a user country, 
i.e. where the country support RES projects in other countries, might be quite low as the 
development of industries will take place in another country and the user country will thus miss 
the indirect benefits of development of technologies and industries. 
 
The traditional problem of acceptance issues in the host country, due e.g. to more wind turbines in 
the landscape, will also constitute a barrier. However, as the wind power projects implemented as 
cooperation most likely will be offshore wind farms these are less relevant issues as the visual and 
noise impact are limited.  
 
Finally, as the focus of the cooperation mechanisms is to decrease the cost of reaching the RES 
targets and not necessarily focus on where new installed capacity of electricity production is 
needed, an extension of the connection between countries or regions and thus an extension of 
transmission lines such as overhead cables may be required. As overhead cables are regulated by 
complicated administrative procedures and have substantial negative visual impact, political as 
well as social acceptance of cooperation might decrease.   
2.4.3 EU policy 
One important barrier to cooperation is the lack of clear EU regulation when it comes to the case 
of non-compliance. It is not specified what the consequences will be if a country fail to comply 
with their target and the lack of an actual penalty mans that the alternative costs compared to 
complying presumably is perceived to be zero.  
 
As the MS do not have a clear perception of the consequences of not complying, and cooperation 
is a mean to comply, the motivation and incentives to take actions in order to be sure to comply is 
decreased with the lack of clear policy in the area.  
2.5 Compensatory challenges 
Member states will only agree on cooperation if they both benefit from it. This means that the 
overall benefits from cooperation for both (all) members states have to exceed the overall costs 
from cooperation. Klessmann (2009) describes the different elements of costs and benefits for 
each MS under a cooperation mechanism. A barrier arises as costs and benefits are not evenly 
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distributed between the participating countries, and therefore special mechanisms to share them 
need to be devised.  
 
First of all there is a problem in determining how to divide the net-benefits but more importantly: 
most benefits are difficult if not impossible to quantify and hence settling the compensation will 
be just as difficult. In the following sections we address the various benefits from cooperation.  
 
Independently of whether each country actually possesses the RES capacity to meet their 2020 
RES targets, countries could benefit from cooperation: Assuming that the costs of installing the 
marginal RES unit in one country is less than the costs of installing the marginal RES unit in 
another country, the country with the highest marginal costs of RES will benefit from installing its 
RES in the first country. Furthermore, the country with the lowest marginal RES costs also benefit 
from cooperation. The benefits of cooperation can be grouped into two categories: 
1. Direct benefits: reduced target compliance costs for the user country 
2. Indirect benefits: benefits linked to the indirect effects of cooperation e.g. reduced cost in 
electricity supply and faster RE technological progress 
The direct benefits primarily profit the user country whereas the indirect benefits to a higher 
extent are related to the effects in the host country. 
2.5.1 Direct benefits 
Cooperation and coordination of implementation of renewable energy across countries can 
contribute to a more efficient expansion of renewable generation and can therefore reduce the 
costs of compliance with 2020 renewable targets. The larger the difference between marginal 
costs of RES expansion between two countries, the larger the benefits of jointly meeting the 
targets will be, since the country with the higher costs of RES expansion will face substantially 
lower costs exploiting the opportunity to install the RES in another country. The cost reduction 
will not be equally shared between the two countries in the first place as the user country is the 
one experiencing the direct benefits by achieving the target less costly. The host country, on the 
other hand, experience direct costs related to grid connection issues.  
 
The direct costs and benefits for the countries participating in cooperation are not automatically 
shared between the countries in an equal manner. The settling of a mechanism to assure a fair 
division of costs and benefits may be difficult and therefore constitute a barrier.  
2.5.2 Indirect benefits 
It is quite important that the direct benefits, given by reduced costs of compliance with 2020 
renewable targets, are not achieved at the expense of some indirect objectives of the national RES 
policies. The secondary group of benefits of cooperation accounts for the less measurable benefits 
as well as other secondary policy objectives. We have identified the most relevant indirect 
benefits to include: 
 Technology 
 Power generation efficiency 
 Employment 
 Environmental 
 Security of supply 
 Investor risk 
 National risk of compliance 
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In the following we describe and discuss each of the identified indirect benefits: 
 
Technology 
One of the most important indirect benefits expected is the improvement of technological 
progress. An increase in the installed capacity of renewable energy sources is expected to lead to 
an increase in the level of research and development (R&D). This eventually leads to learning 
effects and thus faster RE technological progress in the host country. This assumption is 
supported by Bürer and Wurstenhagen (2009), Lund (2011) and Loiter and Norberg-Bohm (1999) 
concluding that subsidies for renewable energy create technological development.  
 
As discussed above (Section 2.1.2) one purpose of subsidising renewable energy could be to 
develop domestic industries. That support could very well be founded in the assumption of 
increased R&D, learning effects and RE technological development. In the case of cooperation 
the user country will directly and indirectly support industries in the host country and therefore 
not harvest the indirect benefits of supporting renewable energy, only initially compensated by the 
direct benefit, i.e. reduced compliance costs. This potential loss of net-benefits may constitute a 
barrier towards cooperation.  
 
Power generation efficiency 
Assuming increased cooperation would result in renewable investments where additional power 
generation capacity is actually required, the power generation efficiency would improve, and 
hence the power generation costs would be reduced. In this case, the investors of the relatively 
new conventional generation would benefit from having invested in a user country as opposed to a 
host country. However, from the overall country perspective, this is not a sufficient condition for 
launching cooperation.  In contrast, increased cooperation would result in renewable investments 
where additional renewable generation will replace relatively new efficient conventional 
generation and hence decrease the power generation efficiency. 
 
Cooperation projects that involve expanding the interconnection capacities, for example to bring 
off-shore wind power a-shore in a high price area, would certainly also improve the generation 
allocation efficiency.  
 
Employment 
A number of studies (Lehr et al (2008), Mathiesen et al (2011), Blanco and Rodrigues (2009) and 
Hillebrand et al (2006)) deal with the employment effects of additional renewable energy 
capacity. The overall conclusion is that there are positive employment effects in the short run. 
Lehr et al. (2008) conclude that there is a positive effect in the long run as well whereas 
Hillebrand et al. (2006) find that in the long run the effect turns negative, however small. 
 
Investment in renewable deployment creates temporary employment in the construction phase, 
and permanent employment in operation and maintenance. The short term employment benefit is 
often assumed to affect more remote areas with weak employment opportunities to a higher 
degree than conventional power plant investments (sse e.g. Hanley and Nevin 1999).  Permanent 
jobs are also for some renewable technologies (e.g. biomass) seen as exceeding the number of 
jobs that they replace in the conventional generation. 
 
Furthermore, increase in the installed capacity of renewable energy is assumed to lead to higher 
level of research and development and thus faster RE technological progress. This is expected to 
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have positive employment effects in MS. Furthermore, as installing more RES capacity is 
expected to increase the domestic demand for RES technologies and learning effects are expected 
to provide competitive advantages for producers of renewable technology. This again is expected 
to result in higher employment. 
 
As the user country directly and indirectly supports these positive employment effects in the host 
country, the user country may be reluctant to engage in cooperation. However, if the user country 
has lots of international companies, operating in RES, the net effects could also be positive. For 
example in the case of wind offshore, the wind-offshore companies of the user country could 
participate to tenders and lead large developments of offshore wind in another country.  
 
Environment 
Environmental concerns must be seen as the major direct argument for the RES targets set for 
2020. The environmental effects are for the climate impact part identical for all the EU countries 
and therefore do not provide additional benefits for a host country of renewable installations. 
There may be some other environmental benefits that depend directly on the location of RES 
installations. That may be emission reduction for NOx, particulates or even reduction of noise. In 
case there is a future binding CO2 target for each country and quota trade deployment of 
additional RES would provide a benefit to the host country as long as this is not adjusted for in the 
future CO2 targets. Even though there is an effect at the host country level, it will not affect the 
total EU level emission or compliance cost for its overall target.      
 
Security of supply 
Another benefit from cooperation across countries is increased security of supply. This is 
especially the case if cooperation involves increased interconnection capacity and cooperation 
mechanisms are heavily used. However, this is not expected to happen prior to 2020. 
Interconnection will also reduce the reserve capacity requirement and thereby costs of securing 
supply. Additionally, possible positive effects from harmonising connection, planning, and 
support administrative procedures will lead to faster implementation of best practices and thus 
improved security of supply. 
 
The effect on security of supply in case of relatively large changes in RES expansion depends 
critically on the effect on other generators and their incentives for maintaining conventional 
power capacity. If cooperation results in more fluctuating RES generation, this capacity will only 
add marginally to security of supply. In a situation where this leads to decommissioning of 
conventional more controllable capacity the total effect on security could be negative. For most 
RES expansion it is however plausible that the effect on other generation will be to reduce 
operational time and only limited decommissioning will occur. The effects on security will thus 
be neutral.  
 
Third countries that act as transit for physical exchange of power from joint projects could 
experience a deterioration in security due to more likely congestion in transmission. They may 
also experience a positive impact if more interconnection capacity for the third country is a result 
of the joint project. If all electricity from a joint project is physically transferred from host country 
to user country without connection to host country no effect on security will be observed.  
 
Investor risk 
One of the barriers for investors in renewable energy is the regulatory risk. Investors being 
uncertain of the future support policy will choose not to invest in a new technology as compared 
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to other markets. However, joint support schemes and joint projects across countries targeting the 
2020 RES targets will imply a larger degree of certainty as a change in the support scheme would 
be equal to a breach of international contracts and is therefore not expected.  
 
National risk of compliance 
Finally, reduced national risk of compliance represents an indirect benefit of cooperation. The risk 
of not complying with the 2020 RES targets for the country initially being in lack of renewable 
capacity will be strongly reduced if not eliminated.   
 
2.5.3 Concluding remarks 
Above we presented and discussed the most important indirect benefits connected to cooperation. 
Some of the benefits are mainly affecting the user country and some mainly the host country and a 
few both of them. As the precondition for cooperation is that both (all) participating countries 
experience net-benefits from cooperation the indirect and direct benefits have to balanced between 
the participating countries. Some sort of compensation scheme has to be in place in order to 
assure this including evaluating the effects in monetary terms. Establishing such a compensation 
scheme constitutes a serious potential barrier for cooperation. 
2.6 Uncertainty regarding the post 2020 targets 
The EU targets for 2020 RES shares have been set without specifying the targets for the following 
years. This is creating high uncertainty about the continuous development of renewable resources,  
and also leads to high uncertainty regarding the investments made up to 2020. For cooperation 
this is a major barrier, as potential user countries will focus entirely on the 2020 RES 
contributions to their target, and de facto focus on the costs of RES credits for a single year. On 
the other hand, the costs from investments in renewable technologies with 15-25 years lifetime 
will be very large compared to RES credits for a single year. The value of the electricity generated 
post 2020 will cover part of the investment, but for almost all renewable investment there is a 
considerable cost disadvantage compared to conventional technologies.  
 
Cooperation with high uncertainty about the future targets will thus face high cost barriers with 
RES credits having only a relatively well known value in 2020 and extremely high uncertainty 
post 2020. In the extreme situation credits post 2020 will be assigned a zero value.      
 
For host countries this forms a barrier as the uncertainty regarding their own future obligations 
(after 2020) will lead to unwillingness to engage in cooperation involving their cheapest surplus 
resources. They might be willing to provide their surplus RES generation in 2020, but still retain 
the ability to meet additional RES targets post 2020 with their cheap domestic RES resources. As 
these future targets are not known the value of this ability is very uncertain. If marginal RES long 
term generation costs are close to power prices the barrier will be less important.  
 
The barriers for host countries would diminish if there is a perceived domestic value (higher 
willingness to pay) for reaching RES shares above the 2020 target, i.e. targets past 2020. In this 
way there could possibly be established a balance between the perceived value of the RES credits 
of the user country and host country.  
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3 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
The purpose of this section is determine which barriers are the most critical to establishing the 
cooperation mechanisms and to identify the critical success factors to remove the barriers.  The 
barriers are evaluated with respect to how difficult they appear to overcome and their possible 
level of obstruction. Furthermore, we briefly touch on the importance relative to the two 
cooperation mechanisms, joint support scheme and joint project.  
3.1 Support schemes 
Earlier we discussed the type of barriers that possibly can arise as a result of differences in 
support schemes in the cooperating countries, either the application of different support schemes 
or combinations of supports schemes as well as the purpose of the support scheme. The historical 
introduction of support schemes has been characterised by several different kinds of support and 
the different support schemes have addressed several technologies Hass et al (2011).  
 
The historical review by Haas et. al. (2011) reveals that investment subsidies, feed in tariffs, 
tendering systems, tax exemptions, premiums, green tariffs and soft loans have played a role in 
the increased deployment of RES in the EU countries. Furthermore, a study intends to determine 
the efficiency of a list of different support systems for the European countries Marques and 
Fuinhas (2012). Both of these studies point towards the fact that the European countries are 
perfectly capable of handling several different support schemes targeting several different energy 
types. Furthermore, they indicate that introducing cooperation mechanisms covering specific 
energy types as well as applying specific support schemes will not be an administrative barrier for 
the EU countries.  
 
In case the host country already has implemented a support scheme targeting a specific energy 
type, and the cooperation mechanism in question suggest the application of another support 
scheme, an adjustment has to take place. This is not assumed to be a difficult barrier to overcome, 
however it is an important barrier.1 The conditions necessary to be in place in order to remove this 
barrier is the willingness and the opportunity to incorporate the additional costs associated with 
implementing an extra support mechanism or handling several support levels for different 
technologies.  
 
With respect to the two cooperation mechanisms, joint support scheme and joint project, the 
barrier arising from having implemented different support schemes in the two countries will be 
most crucial when it comes to joint support scheme. In this case the countries have to harmonise 
such that the support scheme in question is not clashing with another support scheme in any of the 
participating countries.  
 
                                                 
 
 
1 The barriers regarding the purpose of the support schemes as described in the technology specific versus general 
support are covered in Section 3.5.2 
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3.2 Network regulation 
Differences in network regulation is a matter of addressing a legislative issue. As network 
regulation affects the incentives for networks to facilitate efficient connection of new technologies 
and network reinforcement, the connection costs should be reflected in the cost sharing between 
the cooperating countries.  
 
Relating to the two cooperation mechanisms the barriers arising due to differences in network 
regulation appears to be more crucial in case of a joint support scheme compared to a joint 
project. In case of a joint support where the participating countries have different network 
regulation the incentives will differ in the different countries depending on the type of regulation, 
and the renewable energy might not be installed where it is most effective due to imperfections in 
the joint support scheme set up. In case of a joint project specific compensation for the network 
regulation can be agreed upon. 
 
Differences in network regulation is not perceived to be a crucial barrier to overcome, however, if 
it turns out to be necessary barrier to overcome it might be connected with certain difficulties. The 
challenge for the countries is to estimate what are the additional costs associated to that particular 
project as well as to agree on the terms of cost sharing. As some national regulation allow 
networks to include reinforcement investments caused by renewable generation in their capital 
base and thereby revenue cap these costs are to a certain extent known. One of the critical success 
factors is how to share and realise these costs. In case of a joint support scheme a critical success 
factor is to agree on a regulatory set up assuring the installation of RES where it is most effective. 
3.3 Power markets 
3.3.1 Market price and investment incentives 
The largest obstacle when it comes to the differences in power markets between cooperating 
countries is the effect the introduction of large shares of renewable energy has on the power price. 
In order for a country to wish to engage in cooperation mechanisms, the potential losses the 
electricity and heat producers in the host country will experience as a result of the larger share of 
renewable energy in the energy system has to be compensated for, in order to assure future 
incentives for investment in necessary capacity.  
 
The challenge consists of two elements: determining the level of compensation and how to 
address the compensation. The critical success factor in this case is the ability to agree on a 
compensation scheme where the level of compensation should reflect the loss without providing 
undesirable incentives and without compromising the overall precondition that the net-benefits 
from cooperation should be positive.   
 
The barriers related to differences in power process are considerable and not very easy to solve.  
Furthermore, they seem equally relevant to both cooperation mechanisms.  
 
3.3.2 Generation mix 
As the generation mix might be affected, as described above, the existing capacity becomes less 
profitable and the least efficient base load plants may even become loss making. This will then 
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negatively affect the security of supply, as the necessary base load will not be in place when 
renewables produce less, e.g. in case of no wind or overcast. Furthermore, the energy system will 
become more vulnerable to changes in specific fuel prices as the generation mix is less 
diversified.  
 
This is not expected to constitute a major barrier as the development of renewable energy will 
happen over a relatively long time period, and the necessary time to adjust to the new situation is 
assumed to be available. Furthermore, the issue seems equally important for both a joint support 
scheme as well as a joint project. 
 
The challenge is to assure that the markets are adjusted to overcome the changes in the energy 
market. Two factors are important: one is the willingness from the regulatory authorities to help 
enable the adjustment, the other is the time necessary to adjust to the changes such the security of 
supply is maintained.   
3.4 Institutional barriers2 
The additional costs to solving the questions of how to structure the agreements legally and how 
legal agreements traditionally are designed in the one country compared to the other country will 
be minimal compared to other issues regarding the cooperation mechanisms, and will diminish 
and ultimately disappear as experience with the cooperation mechanisms will be gained. 
Furthermore, the additional costs connected to establishing the legal agreements between the 
cooperating countries are easily shared equally between the countries. As legal agreements have 
to be in place independently of the type of cooperation mechanism the barrier is equally important 
for both joint projects and joint support schemes. Thus the critical success factor is initially the 
willingness for the cooperating countries to incorporate the costs of jointly designing such an 
agreement. 
 
Not possessing the knowledge about the alternative costs of not complying with the 2020 targets 
comprises a serious barrier. However, the barrier is sufficiently concrete and is therefore 
perceived to be a simple question to address. On the other hand, the institution that has to assure 
the barrier is overcome is large and probably inflexible, increasing the risk of the barrier not being 
ruled out. The critical success factor in this case it the settlement of exact non-compliance costs. 
 
3.5 Allocation of costs and benefits 
As described earlier, there are a number of indirect cost and benefits that require additional 
adjustments to allocation agreements. The difficulty in quantifying these indirect costs and 
benefits is a barrier for the implementation of cooperation mechanisms. In some situations the 
indirect benefits will be entirely shifted between MS in cooperation and this could be effectively 
hindering the co-operation.  
 
Especially local benefits (jobs, security, innovation, export options) are often mentioned as a 
significant element by political decision makers and they therefore form a barrier if they will be 
negatively affected or missing the positive effects in one country when engaging in cooperation. 
                                                 
 
 
2 The issues regarding political acceptance as well as how the costs of the support are allocated are discussed in 
Section 3.5.2 
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Additionally the compensation for such losses is very hard to quantify into a price premium on the 
RES-certificate transfer price. 
3.5.1 Direct benefits 
The Direct benefits are given by the reduced compliance costs, as a country with higher costs of 
installing the marginal RES unit will benefit from installing its RES in a country with lower costs 
of installing the marginal RES unit. The larger the difference between marginal costs of RES 
expansion between in two countries is the larger the benefits of jointly meeting the targets will be. 
In order for this not to constitute a barrier the cost reduction has to be equally shared between the 
two countries. The sharing mechanism may be difficult to establish, however, the actual level of 
reduced costs can be established rather firmly.  
 
The assessment of the direct benefits will be equally challenging independent of the type of 
cooperation mechanism. In case of a joint project the entire renewable development is expected to 
take place in the host country, whereas under a joint support scheme the renewable energy 
development in principle can take place in all the participating countries (two or more). However, 
the assessment of the direct benefits, i.e. the reduced compliance costs, is equally difficult 
independent of the set up. 
3.5.2 Indirect benefits 
One of the largest and most difficult to overcome barriers is the issue regarding indirect benefits. 
Klessmann et al (2010) states that for a country to agree on the role as a host country, the user 
country has to compensate the host country for the extra costs to the society the additional 
renewable energy causes. However, there is a bigger chance that the user country actually feels 
that they finance indirect benefits in the host country exceeding the additional costs in the host 
country. As mentioned in Section 2.5.2, the possible indirect benefits regard increased 
employment, technological development, industrial development, increased power generation 
efficiency, increased security of supply, reduced investor risk and finally reduced political risk.  
 
Benefits such as increased employment, technological development, industrial development and 
increased power generation efficiency will cause direct economic benefits for the host country but 
are as difficult to estimate as they are diffuse.  The studies Lehr et al (2008), Mathiesen et al 
(2011), Blanco and Rodrigues (2009) and Hillebrand et al (2006) indicate that there are short term 
positive effects from installing additional renewable energy capacity. As an economic crisis with 
high and/or growing unemployment rates is dominating the EU these effects seem very attractive 
to achieve.  
 
Renewable energy support often is justified by the economical side effects from technological 
development, industrial development and employment effects. These economical side effects are 
often assuring the social acceptance towards supporting renewable energy. These effects, 
supported by Marques and Fuinhas (2012) and Söderholm (2008), underpin the importance of 
including these benefits for the host country and the absence of these benefits for the user country 
in the compensation scheme.  
 
The benefits of reduced investor risk as well as national risk of compliance are assumed to benefit 
both host and user country.  
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The assessment of the indirect benefits and costs appear to be connected with more challenges in 
case of a joint support scheme compared to a joint project. In case of a joint project the entire 
renewable development is expected to take place in the host country. In this case the indirect 
benefits mentioned above for the host country as well as the indirect benefits not achieved in the 
user country have to be assessed.  
 
Under a joint support scheme the renewable energy development in principle can take place in all 
the participating countries (two or more). In this case the indirect benefits have to be assessed for 
all the countries and the benefits will undoubtedly differ between the countries. Furthermore, 
there is not certainty about where the renewable development will take place where aspects such 
as administrative issues as well as the before mentioned network regulation might play a role. 
 
3.5.3 Compensation scheme and critical success factors 
All the costs and benefits in the cooperating countries described above have to be captured in an 
overall compensation scheme. The costs and benefits regards: 
 The direct costs associated with additional costs of network regulation and cost sharing as 
some national regulation allow networks to include reinforcement investments caused by 
renewable generation in their capital base and thereby revenue cap.  
 The power price reduction in the host countries leading to a loss for the electricity and heat 
producers who have to be compensated in order to assure future incentives for investment in 
necessary capacity.  
 The lower compliance costs where the reduction has to be equally shared between the two 
countries. 
 The long list of indirect benefits: employment effects, technological development, 
industrial development, improved power generation efficiency, improved security of supply and 
finally reduced investor risk and political risk.  
 
In order to successfully implement a cooperation mechanism between two or more countries all of 
these have to be mirrored in a compensation scheme agreed on between the cooperating countries. 
In particular, the assessment of the indirect costs and benefits has to be satisfactory to all the 
participating countries. Finally, the compensation scheme may not compromise the precondition 
that all countries have to experience net-benefits from cooperating. 
3.6 Post 2020 targets 
The uncertainty regarding the post 2020 targets is assumed to constitute a serious barrier as 
neither the host country or the user country knows the value of the RES after the targets have been 
complied with in 2020. Worst case scenario is that the value is perceived to be zero. In this case 
the host country has to be compensated for the entire costs up front making the 2020 targets 
extremely expensive.  
 
The insecurity regarding the targets after 2020 is equally important for both joint support scheme 
and joint project. As with the case of the uncertainty about the consequences of non-compliance 
the solution to this barrier is also vary concrete: set targets for post 2020. However, the 
institutional set up is large and inflexible and there is a certain risk that it will not be settled in the 
next few years.  
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For the lack of post 2020 targets the critical success factor for MS to engage in cooperation is the 
settlement of post 2020 targets. Each MS can set individual targets; however, without an 
agreement in the EU level the barrier will not be removed.  
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this report we have described the barriers that may arise when using the cooperation 
mechanisms to achieve the renewable energy target for 2020 in EU. We have addressed the issues 
that may arise regarding: 
 differences in support schemes 
 network regulation 
 power market  
 power prices 
 legislation 
 political acceptance 
 uncertainty of non-compliance consequences 
 different institutional barriers 
 compensational challenges 
 uncertainty regarding post 2020 targets 
 
Furthermore, we discussed the extent to which each barrier constitutes a crucial barrier in the 
sense that the cooperation mechanism most likely will not be used if they are not overcome, and 
the level of difficulty to overcome the barriers. We addressed the barriers in relation to the two 
cooperation mechanisms in question, i.e. joint support scheme and joint project and evaluated the 
extent to which the barriers is most relevant to the one or the other or both. Finally, we have 
addressed the issue of critical success factor for each barrier.  
 
In Figure 3 the main categories of the barriers are illustrated according their importance for the 
cooperation mechanisms as well at the expected difficulty with respect to overcoming the barrier.  
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Figure 3 Categorisation of barriers 
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Our analysis indicates that that the institutional barriers as well as the barriers regarding 
generation mix and network regulation do not constitute serious barriers for the implementation of 
cooperation mechanisms. On the other hand we reach the conclusion that the most important 
barriers to overcome are the barriers regarding indirect benefits, power price changes, direct 
benefits, and finally differences in support schemes. Furthermore, it is our expectation that 
assessing the indirect benefits will be a potential source of serious disagreements between the 
cooperating countries and thus conclusively constitute the most important barrier to set up 
solutions for.  
 
The critical success factors identified in the analysis comprise: 
 The willingness and the opportunity to incorporate the additional costs associated with 
implementing an extra support mechanism or handling several support levels for different 
technologies 
 Assessment and agreement on how to share the costs associated with network regulation 
and assure a regulatory set up assuring the most effective installation of RES 
 Market price and investment incentives 
 Determining the level of compensation of changes in market price without providing 
undesirable incentives and maintaining the precondition that the net-benefits from cooperation 
should be positive 
 Willingness and ability to adjust to the changes in the energy market 
 Willingness for the cooperating countries to incorporate the costs legal agreements and 
agree on how to design such an agreement 
 Settlement of exact non-compliance costs 
  
 
D3.1 Barriers and critical success factors 26 
 
 All costs and benefits have to be mirrored in a compensation scheme agreed on between 
the cooperating countries 
 Settlement of clear post 2020 targets 
  
The most critical success factors can be divided into two categories: the factors relating to 
legislation issues (legal agreements, network regulation, non-compliance costs and post 2020 
targets) on the one hand and the compensatory issues on the other. The compensatory issues 
appear to be the least concrete and the most difficult to asses. Further, in case the assessment has 
succeeded the final challenge is to agree on a compensation scheme that satisfies all partners 
without compromising the overall precondition of positive net-benefits for all parties.  
 
The different cooperation mechanisms are thoroughly analysed in Deliverable 3.2 including how 
the identified barriers for each type of cooperation can be tackled. The critical success factors 
identified here are used as a main input in Deliverable 3.2, where solutions and final implications 
for the relevance of the different cooperation mechanisms are identified.  
 
In Deliverables 3.3 to 3.5, specific case studies for individual technologies, namely wind, biomass 
and solar, are considered. The specific barriers that must be overcome are addressed, and concrete 
solutions including quantification of compensation payments are suggested. 
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